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Abstract: This paper analyzes the different options – liquidation, federalization, privatization 
and restructuring – that the Brazilian state government had for the transformation of state 
banks under the Programa de Incentivo á Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade 
Bancária (PROES) in the late 1990s. Specifically, the paper explores (i) the factors behind the 
states’ choices and (ii) the effects of the transformation process on bank performance and 
efficiency. We find that states that were more dependent on federal transfers, whose banks 
were already under federal intervention and that established development agencies were more 
likely to relinquish control over their banks and transformation processes. We find that 
privatized banks improved their performance, while restructured banks did not.   
 
Keywords:  Bank privatization; Brazil; bank performance 
JEL Classification: G21 ; G28 ; H77 
 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3619, June 2005 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if 
the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited 
accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the 
authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries 
they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
 
Beck and Crivelli: World Bank; Summerhill: University of California at Los Angeles. We are grateful to 
Fernando Blanco, Robert Cull, George Clarke, Phil Keefer, Anjali Kumar, Marcio Nakane, Alvaro Vivanco, and 
an anonymous referee for useful suggestions and discussions, and to Duillo Pighi for excellent research and 
editorial assistance.  We also benefited from comments by participants at the World Bank Conference on Bank 


















































































































1.   Introduction 
While Gerschenkron suggested that the state-as-banker could overcome a legacy of 
poor financial intermediation, substitute for the absence of private banks, and impel economic 
growth in poorer nations, government ownership of banks is in fact closely associated with an 
ensemble of problems that afflict developing countries:  low levels of GDP per capita, 
financial backwardness, and a heavy and inefficient state sector (La Porta et al, 2001, Barth. 
Caprio and Levine, 2004; Dinc, 2005). Privatization of government-owned banks could thus 
be expected to improve bank performance, and boost the efficiency of financial 
intermediation.  
This paper analyzes the transformation of state banks in Brazil, where banks owned by 
state governments have undergone a remarkable process of reform in the last decade.  It (i) 
evaluates how states chose between different options they were given by a federal government 
transformation program, and (ii) assesses the effect of privatization, federalization and 
restructuring on the subsequent performance of the state banks. We test for financial, 
economic and political determinants of the choices made by state governments concerning 
their state banks. We then evaluate the impact of the different choices on bank performance 
and compare the effects of the different policy choices with each other. 
State-owned banks have a long tradition in Brazil, as have their financial problems 
(see Ness, 2000, for a historic overview). During the decades before 1994 the Central Bank 
came to their rescue in several instances, bailing them out. Bailouts directly resulted in 
monetary leakages and high moral hazard risk in the relationship both between the federal and 
state governments, and between the Central-Bank-as-bank-supervisor and the banking system.  
Following the implementation of the Real Plan in 1994, which helped considerably in ending   2
hyperinflation, federal authorities addressed the chronic undercapitalization and continuing 
losses of state banks to avoid future monetary leakages through bailouts. After intervening in 
several state banks in 1994 and 1995, the federal government initiated a special program, the 
Programa de Incentivo á Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária (PROES), 
to allow restructuring, privatization or liquidation of state banks. States were given a range of 
choices concerning the future of their banks, linked closely to the terms of debt relief by the 
federal government.  
Under PROES, states had effectively four choices concerning the future of their state 
banks.  They could (i) liquidate, (ii) allow the federal government to privatize, (iii) privatize 
themselves, or (iv) restructure them.  Under the first three options, the federal government 
assumed 100% of any losses that occurred during the process, while it assumed 50% of the 
losses under the restructuring option. Further, states had the option to set up or split off a 
development agency.   However, states could also opt out of the PROES program. These 
options implied different degrees to which state government gave up control over (i) the bank 
itself and (ii) the process under which the bank was resolved or restructured.   Depending on 
one’s point of departure, several competing hypotheses regarding the possible determinants of 
this choice are available.  Political economy models predict a trade-off between the benefits of 
having the state bank as a patronage tool (or using the privatization process to impose 
conditionality on the buyer) and the fiscal costs of continuous losses. Unlike in the period 
before 1994, under PROES these losses could no longer be externalized to the federal 
government. Development theories predict a relationship between the perceived need for state 
involvement in the financial sector, and the state’s willingness or reluctance to give up control 
over its bank.  Political scientists would predict the relationship and political alignment   3
between the state and federal level of government to be a decisive factor behind the PROES 
decisions.  The options under PROES, however, can also be expected to have different 
consequences for operational and financial restructuring and thus the subsequent performance 
of these banks.   
The two questions addressed in this paper are important for both academics and 
policymakers.  First and most generally, the results help us assess the effect of bank 
privatization on performance and compare it with the effects of restructuring and staying in 
government ownership. These results can inform policymakers in Brazil and other countries 
with fragile government banks.  Second, the results help us evaluate different approaches to 
privatization, specifically, intervention and subsequent privatization by the federal 
government versus privatization by the original owner, the state government. Third, they help 
us understand the factors behind the political process of bank privatization, and ultimately the 
determinants of continued government ownership of banks around the globe.  
  The Brazilian PROES offers us a natural experiment to study the determinants and 
consequences of a state bank resolution program. The process was started by an event, the 
Real Plan, which was outside the control of any individual state and not primarily caused by 
the undercapitalization of state banks.  The large number of banks that were resolved over a 
short time period - all but two states owned banks -, a relatively equal distribution of banks 
across the different policy alternatives and the variation in economic and political structure 
across states allow us to relate variation in the political and economic structure of states to the 
political decision on their banks, and to relate subsequent performance of these banks to the 
different choices states made.   4
Data shortages and the short time that has passed since the implementation of PROES 
limit our analysis.  First, although states decided on the transformation options at different 
points in time, we assess states’ choices in a cross-section rather than taking into account the 
dynamic aspects. Second, we restrict our evaluation of the PROES to bank performance, 
rather than assessing the impact on economic and financial development on the state level; 
given that some state banks have been privatized only recently and some federalized state 
banks have not yet been privatized, such an analysis would reduce the degrees of freedom 
substantially.  Third, we face a selection bias since the state banks that were liquidated or 
converted into development agencies are not included in the bank-level sample that we use to 
assess their performance. Finally, the bank-level data that are available do not allow us to test 
more sophisticated models of profit and cost efficiency. 
Our results provide support for political economy theories of public ownership, while 
they are inconsistent with developmental hypotheses.  States that were more dependent on 
federal transfers, whose banks were already under federal intervention, and that established 
development agencies were more likely to relinquish control over their banks and the 
transformation process. We find significant and positive effects of privatization on banks’ 
performance, while we cannot find similar improvements for banks that restructured.  In only 
a few cases, however, did these performance improvements go beyond the performance of 
privately owned domestic banks.    
This paper is closely related to two papers by Clarke and Cull (1999, 2002) on the 
Argentine privatization process of provincial banks.  Similar to Brazil, the Argentine 
privatization process started after an exogenous event, i.e. an event outside the control of 
individual states, that made further federal subsidization of provincial banks impossible, and   5
also happened during a relatively short time period.  Unlike the Brazilian case, the Argentine 
provinces faced only the option of privatization to receive federal funding.  Analyzing the 
timing of the privatization, Clarke and Cull find that - consistent with political economy 
models of privatization - provinces with poorly performing banks and thus higher costs of 
government ownership were more likely to privatize their banks, while those provinces where 
politicians could derive higher benefits showed a lower probability of privatization.  Clarke 
and Cull also find performance and efficiency improvements, post-privatization.   
This paper is also related to Baumohl and Nakane (2005) who use a model developed 
by Olley and Pakes (1996) to assess the effect bank privatization on bank productivity. Unlike 
them we analyze a broader range of PROES options and also evaluate the factors behind the 
different PROES options.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 offers background 
information on Brazil’s banking system and the privatization process.  Section 3 tests 
different hypotheses on the state government’s decisions on their banks under PROES. 
Section 4 describes the data and the methodology for the bank-level performance regressions.  
Section 5 presents the results of the bank-level regressions and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   Bank privatization in Brazil 
One of the more remarkable features of Brazil’s move toward privatization in the 
1990s was the progressive dismantling of debt-ridden state banks.  State banks were an 
important segment of the public bank sector; state-owned and federally-owned banks together 
constituted over 50% of overall banking system assets in 1994 (Table 1).  Some of the state 
banks were also among the largest Brazilian banks. BANESPA, owned by the state   6
government of São Paulo, ranked third in terms of assets in 1994, while the other São Paulo 
state bank, Nossa Caixa, ranked 11
th.  The roots of these banks, both historically and 
politically, ran deep in Brazil, which has a long tradition of such financial institutions.  Banks 
owned by state governments appeared during the First Republic (1889-1930), and multiplied 
over the course of the twentieth century.
1  Their ostensible purposes included handling public-
sector payrolls, and financing state-level development projects.  Yet they increasingly came to 
serve as major instruments of state-level deficit financing.
2  State banks were a critical 
component in the machinery of generating employment, patronage, and securing electoral 
support.
3  Since the costs of these activities were spread broadly, while the banks’ benefits 
were concentrated more narrowly, they were politically valuable instruments.   
By the end of Brazil’s military dictatorship in the mid 1980s most state banks were in 
dire straits.  State banks had repeatedly relied on the Central Bank and state coffers to relieve 
them of liabilities or to recapitalize them.
 4  In the context of worsening economic conditions 
and public sector deficits a disproportionate share of state bank income derived from 
inflation-based revenues.
5  Banks used short-term deposits imperfectly protected from 
inflation to purchase securities that yielded much higher rates of interest than were paid to 
depositors.
6  Inflation-float revenue became a key source of bank earnings for the Brazilian 
banking sector as a whole, and especially important for state banks. 
                                                 
1 Baer and Nazmi (2000), 5. 
2 Ness (2000), 72; Baer and Nazmi (2000), 7; McQuerry (2001), 38; Maia (1999), 115. 
3 Baer and Nazmi (2000), 7. 
4 Ness (2000), 75. Compare Sola, Garman and Marques (2001) and Lundberg (1999) for a detailed discussion on 
the use of the monetary reserve by the Central Bank to bail out state banks in the 1980s and 1990s. 
5 McQuerry (2001), 38. 
6 Baer and Nazmi (2000), 6; Ness (2000), 75.   7
The Brazilian government introduced its inflation-defeating monetary reform, known 
as the Real Plan, in July of 1994.
7  By eliminating price inflation in a setting where inflation 
sometimes ran as high as 70 percent per month the plan also eliminated the easiest way that 
banks made money.
8  Bank revenues that hinged on inflation-based “float” earnings dried up, 
falling from 35 percent of sectoral revenues to effectively zero between 1993 and 1995.
9  In 
response, banks increased their lending business, without adequate risk analysis and 
information on borrowers, and without adequate bank supervision by the Central Bank. As the 
government defended the currency and real interest rates skyrocketed, indebted businesses 
increasingly failed, and banks found themselves holding an increasing share of non-
performing loans, including those made to state-owned companies.  Numerous Brazilian 
banks, both public and private, became increasingly fragile.  The ensuing interventions in 
state banks by the Central Bank, beginning at the end of 1994, were part and parcel of a 
broader clean up of the banking sector.   They differed from interventions in private banks, 
however, in that reducing the presence of state governments in the banking sector formed part 
of larger debt settlement arrangements between states and the federation.
10   
Central bank led reforms of state banks came in two main phases.  The first saw 
interventions in the largest and most problem-ridden state banks at the end of 1994 and early 
1995.  Existing legislation empowered the Central Bank to intervene in banks, liquidate banks 
extra-judicially, and place banks under special temporary management (Regime de 
Administração Especial Temporária-RAET).
11  The second phase came with the late 1996 
decree of the Program of Incentives for the Reduction of States’ Participation in Banking 
                                                 
7 Franco (1995); Franco (2000). 
8 McQuerry (2001), 33. 
9 Mendonca de Barros, et al. (1997); Maia (1999); Baer and Nazmi (2000), 8. 
10 Maia (1999), 116-117; Baer and Nazmi (2000), 14. 
11 Lundberg (1999); Siqueira (n.d.).   8
Activities (Programa de Incentivo á Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade 
Bancária-PROES).  PROES created mechanisms by which state governments could repair or 
dispose of their banks with federal resources, and has served as the basis for most of the state 
bank reforms to date.
12 
Intervention of the Central Bank in state banks in the first phase under RAET differed 
from simple intervention and extra-judicial liquidation in that the normal activities of the state 
banks continued unaltered.  During the period that RAET is in effect (which is flexible and at 
the discretion of the Central Bank), depositors are protected.  At the end of 1994  (on the eve 
of newly elected governors from the President-elect’s own party (PSDB) taking office in the 
states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo), the Central Bank intervened using RAET in both 
BANERJ and BANESPA, two of the largest and most indebted banks.
13   Public authorities 
were careful to stress that intervention was being conducted in accordance with RAET, and 
promised the preservation of the accounts of depositors.  Pedro Malan, president of the 
Central Bank, asserted that “anyone who wants to go to the banks on Monday to take out their 
money will encounter plenty of cash at their disposal.”
14  All told, five state banks were 
placed under RAET through 1995.
15  Some other state financial entities were liquidated 
outright; at the same time Central Bank intervened in BANERJ and BANESPA, it also closed 
a relatively small bank in the state of Rio Grande do Norte.
16 
                                                 
12 PROES followed on the heels of a similar program to restructure or close troubled private-sector banks, 
known as PROER.  Some of the state banks that underwent early intervention were actually privatized under 
PROER, rather than PROES. 
13 Folha de São Paulo, 31 Dec 1994. 
14 Ibid., 5. 
15 Maia (1999), 111; in addition to BANERJ and BANESPA, state banks in Alagôas, Mato Grosso, and 
Rondônia were placed under RAET; Ness (2000), 77. 
16Folha de São Paulo, 31 Dec 1994, 1-2. Later the state bank of Amapá was liquidated by the Central Bank, 
without recourse to the Regime of Special Temporary Administration.  Though the bank’s liabilities were only 
modestly in excess of its assets, it had fraudulently issued nearly six billion dollars’ worth of bonds that were   9
The second phase of state bank reforms came with the implementation of the 1996 
PROES decree in early 1997.  Like intervention under RAET, PROES safeguarded depositors 
while the state bank’s final fate was being determined.  It differed from RAET, however, in 
that it was part of a broader program to address state government debts.
17  In 1997 and 1998 
22 out of 27 states in Brazil renegotiated their debt with the federal government, and the 
disposition of state banks was a central element of the renegotiations.
18  Debt restructuring 
was done in a way that allowed state banks to swap state-government bonds for federal bonds.  
The level of state debt was then reduced by the federal government, which created a 
considerable subsidy in the form of accepting below-market interest rates on the state bonds 
they acquired.
19 Overall, the refinanced debt varied between 1% of state GDP and 19% of 
state GDP.  While there were no penalties for not participating in PROES, the dire straits in 
which the finances of many states were and the weak financial situation of most state banks 
gave sufficient incentives for all but two states to participate. Furthermore, if deciding not to 
participate in PROES, the state government would be liable for any future losses of its 
bank(s).
20 
Under PROES, there were four possible policy options for a state bank.  These were 1) 
liquidation; 2) submission to federal control for subsequent liquidation or privatization; 3) 
privatization under state auspices; and 4) restructuring and continuation as a state bank.  
Additionally, states had the options to set up or split off from a privatized or liquidated bank a 
development agency. Funding to these development agencies can be provided only by other 
                                                                                                                                                          
collateralized by a huge land tract of uncertain title.  Forgeries of signatures of Central Bank officials were 
discovered on the deal, and the Central Bank liquidated the bank; Folha de São Paulo, 4 Sep 97, 10. 
17 Bevilacqua (1999); Ness (2000). 
18 The states that did not participate were mostly recently created states without significant outstanding debt.  
19 See Maia (1999), 116, and Bevilaqua (1999) for more details.  
20 Under Brazilian law, bank shareholders are liable for any losses beyond paid-in capital.   10
domestic or foreign development agencies, treasuries or constitutional funds, but not by 
deposits from the general public; these agencies are allowed to invest only in priority areas as 
defined by the state government. Privatized banks were sold to strategic investors, i.e. foreign 
or domestic private banks, with the state relinquishing all control; in some cases, however, up 
to 10% of the shares were reserved for bank employees.  Given the traditional importance of 
state banks in deficit financing, and their politicized use by governors, the above mentioned 
list represents a likely inverse ranking of what state authorities desired as the outcome for 
their bank.  However, the a-priori preferred option - restructuring a state bank and keeping it - 
required that the state provide at least half of the restructuring costs and change 
management.
21 For most state governments, recapitalizing their bank was likely considerably 
more costly than the political benefits they stood to lose when relinquishing control.
22  
Under PROES a good portion of Brazil’s public financial system has been restructured 
since 1997.  Specific outcomes under PROES varied, and not only by state; since some states 
had more than one bank, outcomes varied by bank as well.  Table 2 provides a summary of 
the status of each of the state banks.  Two of the states—Mato Grosso do Sul and Tocantins—
had no bank.  All other states had at least one state-owned bank.  The state of Paraíba opted 
out of PROES altogether, as did the Federal District.  Seven states had more than one state 
financial institution.  The state of Espírito Santo apparently had one bank under PROES, but 
was able to opt out with respect to its second bank.
23  Six states were able to restructure a 
bank and keep it, including four states that had more than one bank, though Espírito Santo is 
currently attempting to privatize.  Nine banks have been privatized to strategic investors; five 
                                                 
21 The federal government also covered only 50% of the losses in the cases where the state government decided 
to privatize or liquidate one, but keep and restructure another state bank.  
22 Ness (2000), 80. 
23 Folha de São Paulo 12 May 2000.   11
more banks are slated for privatization, but with no definite date set.  The privatization and 
liquidation of state banks under PROES has contributed significantly to the decrease in 
government ownership in the Brazilian banking system.  By end-1999 it has fallen to 43% of 
total assets.  This decline has been accompanied by a significant increase in foreign 
participation in the Brazilian banking system (Table 1). 
 
3.   PROES and the determinants of the different options 
  While there is a large literature analyzing the politics of privatization of non-financial 
companies, there are few papers discussing the political decision process to privatize 
government-owned banks.
24  We therefore build on the economics of state ownership of 
banks for our hypothesis testing on states’ different choices under PROES.
25 
To explore the factors behind the different methods of transformation of state banks, 
we construct a variable capturing the different options.  Transformation equals one if the state 
bank was liquidated, two if the federal government took it over, three if the state government 
privatized it, and four if the bank was restructured and stayed in government ownership.  This 
variable is structured in a way that higher values signify more decision power retained by the 
state government.
26  However, the decision power of state government varied, since five state 
banks were already taken over by the Central Bank under the RAET before the PROES was 
                                                 
24 On the politics of privatization in general, see Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (2002). Boehmer et al. 
(2005) use a panel of 101 countries over the period 1982-2000 to analyze the determinants of bank privatization 
decisions, while Clarke and Cull (2002) assess the factors behind the timing of provincial bank privatization in 
Argentina.  
25 Compare La Porta et al. (2002). 
26 We also tried a simple dummy variable that takes value one if a bank is restructured and zero otherwise.  The 
use of dummy variables as dependent and as independent variables (see below), however, posed econometric 
problems.    12
initiated.    We control for this factor with the dummy variable RAET.
27  Finally, 15 states set 
up or split off development agencies from their state banks; we control for this by introducing 
the dummy variable DFI.  
  Political economy approaches predict that state governments assess the trade-off 
between (i) the political benefits of keeping their banks under state ownership to use them as 
patronage tools or at least keeping as much control over the resolution process as possible (by 
being able to impose certain conditions on the purchaser) and (ii) the fiscal costs of doing so. 
Additionally, many states faced a more imminent liquidity constraint.  By offering to take 
over 100% of losses incurred during the resolution process, but only 50% if the state kept 
ownership over at least one bank, the federal government tipped the monetary balance against 
restructuring.  This intuition provides us with our first set of hypotheses relating the economic 
conditions of the state and its bank to the character of the reform decision.  States with larger 
fiscal deficits and more dependent on federal transfers would most likely be more inclined to 
accept the options of liquidating or privatizing their banks, since their budgets were less likely 
to support additional strain from accumulating state bank losses. This is especially true given 
the credit and financing constraints that many states faced.  Transfers as share of total 
revenues varies between 7% in São Paulo to 78% in Amapa, while the fiscal balance varied 
between a surplus of 2.2% of GDP in Maranhao to a deficit of 1.8% of GDP in Acre.  States 
with larger GDP per capita and lower poverty rates would be less willing to give up their 
banks, given that they have more fiscal resources or have a better institutional framework to 
limit the fiscal cost and economic distortions of state ownership in the banking system.  State 
                                                 
27 We also re-ran the regressions without the states whose bank was intervened under RAET and obtain the same 
results as reported below.     13
banks with worse performance and lower efficiency would be more likely to be privatized or 
liquidated given their higher cost to the state’s budget. 
  Theories focusing on the developmental character of state banks provide us with 
several other predictions about the relationship between a state’s economic structure, and the 
government’s willingness to give up its state bank.  Unlike political economy theories, 
developmental theories do not see state banks as patronage tools to distribute benefits to 
narrow and small groups, but rather focus on their benefits for the overall economy and 
society.   First, developmental theories would predict that poorer states – depending more on 
federal transfers - would be rather less willing to give up their banks, while richer states might 
have a better developed judicial and institutional framework to support private banking 
activity.
28  Second, given the long tradition of providing agricultural credit through 
government-owned banks, these theories would also predict states with larger agricultural 
sectors to be less likely to give up their banks. Similarly, developmental theories would 
predict that state banks with more retail orientation would be less likely to be privatized or 
liquidated.
29   
  Finally, political scientists stress the increasing interest of Brazilian politicians in 
developing reputations as leaders who could deliver the goods to the constituents of their 
states during the 1980s and 1990s.  Elected office holders, whether they occupy a 
congressional seat and want to move to the state executive or the governor’s office or want to 
maximize their reelection chances, focus their efforts on extracting as much as possible for 
their states from the federal government’s common pool of resources.  In the case of PROES, 
this would imply bargaining over different options.  Politicians’ success at pulling down 
                                                 
28 Compare Pinheiro and Cabral (1998). 
29 Alternatively, one could argue that banks with stronger retail orientation have stronger political clout and can 
therefore more easily resist liquidation or privatization.   14
resources for their states, however, depends at least in part on their ties to the president.  The 
emphasis is on membership in either the President’s party or coalition on the part of Senate 
delegations from each state. For each state’s senate delegation we incorporate a measure of 
the proportion of the federal senators from each state that are members of the PSDB, and 
similarly the proportion that are members of parties included in the president’s coalition.  The 
relationship between these measures of political closeness to the Cardoso government and 
PROES decision, however, is not unambiguous.  On the one hand, one could expect states 
whose senators are politically closer to the federal government are better able to negotiate to 
keep their banks or at least privatize themselves.  On the other hand, one could expect states 
whose leaders were more closely tied to the ruling coalition  in the federal government to 
more easily agree to liquidation or federalization in return for other political or fiscal benefits.  
We assess the explanatory power of political economy and developmental theories of 
government-owned banks by regressing Transformation on an array of economic, social and 
bank-level financial indicators.
30 Given the ordinal character of Transformation, we employ 
an ordered probit model.
31  We use data bank-level data for 1996 and state-level averaged 
over 1995 to 2000, assembled from different Brazilian data sources.
32  
                                                 
30 We do not include the two states without state banks and the Federal District, which opted out of the PROES, 
and did not privatize its bank. We do, however, include Paraiba, since it privatized its state bank, though outside 
the PROES; our results, however, are robust to its exclusion. We also include São Paulo as a case where bank 
privatization happened under the auspices of the federal government.  For the regressions including bank-level 
performance indicators as explanatory variables, we lose observations since we do not have observations for 
most of the liquidated banks.  In the cases where we have bank-level data for more than one state bank, we 
average these data for use in the ordered probit analysis. 
31 While the observed variable Transformation has only four outcomes, there is a continuous underlying 
unobserved variable, the political preference of state governments.  Each outcome of Transformation 
corresponds to a specific range of political preferences.  We use standard maximum likelihood estimation with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  In robustness tests, we also use the multinominal logit model, which 
yields the same results. 
32 The political, economic, and financial variables used here, and in subsequent sections, are elaborated in the 
paper’s appendices.   15
  The results in Table 3 provide evidence for political economy explanations of the 
transformation process, but are not consistent with developmental explanations of the 
transformation process.  The results indicate that states that depend more on federal transfers 
and that set up development agencies were more likely to relinquish control over their banks 
and over the transformation process.  The federal government was both more burdened by 
high-transfer states, and likely exercised more leverage over them in debt renegotiations.  Not 
surprisingly, banks that were already intervened under RAET in 1994 and 1995 were less 
likely to be restructured and then returned to the hands of the governor.  All three variables do 
not only enter statistically significant, but are also of large economic significance.  For 
example, moving from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile in transfers, predicts a 33-percentage 
point difference in the probability that a state decided to restructure its bank or not.
33 
Most of the social and political variables do not enter significantly. Whether a state 
was rich or poor does not appear to matter to the outcome.  Neither GDP per capita, the share 
of state output originating in agriculture, nor the poverty rate enter significantly.  Nor do any 
characteristics of the bank’s performance seem to matter for how it was dealt with.  None of 
the bank efficiency measures nor our indicator of retail orientation – the share of savings 
deposits in total assets-- enter significantly in the regression.  Finally, only one of the partisan 
political variables enters significantly.  The share of the state’s federal senate delegation that 
belonged to the president’s party enters negatively at the 5% level, while the share of the 
senate delegation that belongs to one of the government coalition parties does not enter 
                                                 
33 We also tested whether states that renegotiated a larger share of their debt with the federal government or had 
a larger share forgiven, were more likely to liquidate their state bank or have it federalized.  However, we could 
not find a significant relationship between the outcome of the debt negotiations and the policy chosen for the 
state bank.    16
significantly.
34  The results here indicate that the closer the state’s congressional delegation 
was to the president, the more likely the state bank was to be liquidated or privatized. This 
suggests that the executive might have found it easier to do away with state banks in states 
where he had stronger ties to the congressional delegates, perhaps because they could be 
compensated with political currency more readily. The executive simultaneously wielded 
greater punitive powers within the party as well if party members opposed the elimination of 
the state bank. 
  These results have to be interpreted with an important caveat.  The small number of 
observations does not allow us to control for many different factors simultaneously. 
Idiosyncratic differences between the states are not captured in our regression.  Finally, the 
time dimension, the fact that the states did not take the decision simultaneously is not 
explicitly modeled in our regressions.
35  
 
4.   Bank-level regressions: data and methodology 
In order to assess the performance and efficiency effects of the different PROES 
options, we utilize an unbalanced panel of 207 banks with quarterly data over the period 
January 1995 to September 2003, with a total of 4,864 observations.  Our sample contains 19 
of the 35 state banks. These banks were federalized, privatized and restructured at different 
points during our sample period. Liquidated state banks are not included.  Further, we had to 
drop several banks for which we have incomplete data.   
                                                 
34 In regressions we do not report here, we also tried measures of the share of a state’s delegation in the House 
that belonged to the PSDB (the government coalition).  Further, we used a dummy variable indicating whether a 
state’s governor was member of the PSDB (one of the parties of the government coalition).  In line with the 
results in Table 3, we find that states with a higher share of PSDB deputies or a governor belonging to one of the 
parties supporting the Cardoso government were more likely to liquidate their state banks or have it federalized. 
35 Compare Clarke and Cull (2002) on Argentina.   17
We focus on three performance measures.  Return on Equity (ROE) is defined as 
profits relative to equity, while Return on Assets (ROA) is profits relative to total assets.  
Overhead costs/assets are the total administrative costs relative to total assets. The first two 
indicators are measures of profitability, while the third one is a measure of cost efficiency.  
There is a wide variation in performance and efficiency across banks and over time 
(Table 4 Panel A).  ROE and ROA vary between high negative and positive outliers, with 
averages of –13 and zero percent respectively.  In the case of the return on equity, however, 
this is driven by the negative outliers; the median is 3%.
36 Overhead costs relative to total 
assets vary between zero and 69%, with a mean of 2% and a median of 1%.  Banks with 
higher overhead costs show lower profitability (Table 4 Panel B).
37 
To assess the effect of privatization on bank performance, while controlling for other 
bank characteristics, we utilize the following regression
38: 
Performancei,t = α +β1 Assetsi,t-1  + β2Fixed Assetsi,t + β3Savings Depositsi,t + 
β4Eventually Federalized and Privatizedi,t + β5Federalized before Privatizationi,t  + 
β6Privatized after Federalizationi,t + β7 Time since Privatization after Federalization + 
β8Eventually Privatizedi,t + β9Privatizedi,t + β10 Time since Privatization + β11Eventually 
Federalizedi,t + β12Federalizedi,t + β13 Time since Federalization +β14Eventually Restructuredi,t 
+ β15 Restructured + β16 Time since Restructuring + β17Non-participating State Banksi,t + 
β18Federal Banki,t + β19Foreign Banki,t + ε i,t 
                                                 
36 The high negative outliers in the case of ROE are also explained by the following adjustment we make in the 
case of negative equity: we set equity at 1% of assets to avoid that a bank with negative equity and losses shows 
a positive ROE.  
37 Note that these are quarterly data.  For annualized data, these would have to be multiplied by four.  Since we 
use a linear estimation model, there is only a scaling effect. 
38 Similar models are employed by Berger et al. (2005) and Beck et al. (2005).   18
where Performance is one of three variables measuring the performance of bank i in 
quarter t. Those variables include return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and the 
ratio of overhead costs to total assets. 
  We use a vector of explanatory variables to de-compose the causes and effects of 
privatization. The first is Eventually Privatized, a dummy variable that equals one throughout 
the whole sample for state banks that were privatized by the state government at some point.  
We include this variable to capture any selection effect associated with bank privatization and 
with the choice of privatization by the state governments.  The second is Privatized, a dummy 
variable that equals one from the moment bank i is privatized. We define privatization as the 
quarter in which the state government relinquishes ownership.  The third variable is Time 
since Privatization, which measures the years since bank i was privatized. While Privatized is 
included to capture the immediate effects of privatization, including any cleaning of the loan 
portfolio at or just prior to the time of sale, Time since Privatization captures the average 
quarterly performance trend in the wake of that sale.  To statistically assess the effect of 
privatization after quarter n, we evaluate Privatized + n*Time since Privatization. While the 
use of several dummy variables might seem very complex, it helps separate the effect of 
privatization on performance properly by controlling for selection bias.   
  The second vector is for banks that were federalized and subsequently privatized.  To 
assess selection bias and the effects of federalization and privatization, we construct three 
variables: Eventually Federalized and Privatized, Federalized before Privatization, and 
Privatized after Federalization, where the second and the third variables are timed for the 
quarters in which the federal government took responsibility for the bank and in which the   19
government relinquished ownership, respectively.  Finally we introduce a variable Time since 
Privatization after Federalization, which is defined similarly as above. 
  The third vector is for banks that were federalized, but have not been privatized yet.  
Here we construct the variables Eventually Federalized, Federalized, and Time since 
Federalization.  Finally, we construct a vector for banks that were restructured under PROES. 
Specifically, we construct Eventually Restructured, Restructured, and Time since 
Restructuring. Unlike for the previous three sectors, the timing of restructuring is hard to date; 
we chose the quarter, in which the debt relief contract between state and federal government 
was approved by the Federal Senate, as time of restructuring.   Finally, we capture the 
remaining state banks that did not participate in the PROES, in the variable Non Participating 
State Banks.   
  We find a significant negative (positive) correlation of all Eventually variables with 
returns on assets and equity (overhead costs) (Table 4 Panel B), except for Eventually 
Federalized and Privatized. Privatized and Time since Privatization are significantly and 
positively correlated with ROA.  All state and federal banks have a higher share of savings 
deposits relative to assets, which we explain by a higher retail orientation, while foreign banks 
have a lower share.  
  We control for the ownership structure of banks beyond the PROES. Specifically, we 
introduce dummy variables for the federally owned banks and for foreign-owned banks; 
privately owned domestic banks are the omitted category.  We also include a number of 
variables to control for the size of the bank and its business orientation.  Assets is the log of 
real assets measured at time t-1.  Larger banks might have enjoyed scale or scope economies 
that had positive effects on their performance. Further, we include the ratio of fixed assets to   20
total assets and the share of savings deposits over total assets to thus control for the business 
orientation of the bank. Finally, we control for year and season-specific effects.  Specifically, 
we introduce dummy variables for the different years and for the four quarters. 
Since we work with quarterly data and the effect of the transformation process might 
not be immediately effective, we drop the two quarters following immediately the 
transformation date.  However, as noted below, we test for sensitivity of dropping these two 
periods. 
Our sample contains data for both consolidated and unconsolidated banks.  
Specifically, we use unconsolidated balance sheet and income statement information for bank 
groups, which include former state-owned banks, while we use consolidated information for 
other banks in our sample.  To control for a potential selection bias, we introduce a dummy 
variable that takes the value one for banks for which we use unconsolidated information, i.e. 
which belonged to a bank group at some point during the sample period.  We also introduce 
an interaction term of this dummy variable with the log of total assets.
39  
The quality of the data poses a challenge for estimation.  Variation in the quality of 
reporting across banks and over time is exacerbated by the fact that our dataset was assembled 
from different databases of the Brazilian Central Bank.   The mix of banks with consolidated 
and unconsolidated balance sheet information introduces another source of measurement 
error.   All these factors bias our estimations against finding any significant relationship 
between the transformation process and bank performance.  Following Cull, Matesova and 
Shirley (2002), we deal with this problem in two different ways.  First, we restrict the sample 
                                                 
39 We also considered using the total assets of the group instead of mixing consolidated and unconsolidated 
assets.  However, this would introduce unnecessary noise since for privatized banks, total assets would jump in 
the period in which they are purchased by a large bank and thus bias the coefficient on Privatized and Privatized 
after Federalization towards zero.     21
to values of the dependent variable between the 1
st and the 99
th percentiles to thus exclude 
outliers such as discussed above.  Second, we use a robust estimation technique that uses all 
observations available, but assigns different weights to avoid the impact of outliers. 
Specifically, observations are weighted based on absolute residuals, with observations with 
large residuals being assigned smaller weights. Unlike in the case of the truncated sample, 
where we assign a zero weight a-priori to observations with extreme values and one to all 
others, the robust regressions assign these weights in an iterative process. 
We use several additional tests. First, we test for differences across different state 
banks that underwent different treatments during PROES, including state banks that did not 
participate.  This provides us with an additional test – beyond the estimations in section 3 – of 
whether a state government’s decision for a specific option was influenced by its bank’s 
performance. Second, we test whether the different policy options achieved its purpose, i.e. 
improved the negative performance that was the trigger for the PROES in the first place.  
Third, we compare the performance impact of the different options with each other.  
 
5.   PROES and bank performance 
Tables 5 and 6 present our main results.  Table 5 presents results without the Time 
since variables, while the regressions in Table 6 include them.  We present both (i) 
regressions limiting our sample between the 1
st and the 99
th percentile and (ii) robust 
regressions.  Finally, in the case of ROA and ROE, we present regressions with and without 
overhead costs/assets as explanatory variable, to evaluate whether transformation has had any 
effect on performance beyond efficiency improvements.     22
The results in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that (i) all groups of state-owned banks were 
weaker than privately owned domestic banks (the omitted category) and (ii) PROES led to an 
improvement in performance.  Eventually Federalized and Privatized, Eventually Federalized 
and Eventually Privatized enter significantly and negatively in the ROA and ROE regressions 
and significantly and positively in the overhead cost regressions.  Eventually Restructured 
enters significantly and negatively in the ROE and ROA regressions, but insignificantly in the 
overhead cost regressions, which might indicate less need for operational restructuring than in 
other state banks. Non-participating state banks enters with the expected sign in all 
regressions, but not always significantly.  In unreported tests, we also tested for differences 
between the different groups of state banks; while some differences are significant, there is no 
consistent pattern, except that non-participating banks performed in general better than state 
banks that did participate under PROES. While this seemingly confirms the results in Table 3 
that the economic situation of these banks did not impact the political decision that state 
governments took on these banks, data quality and the omission of liquidated banks prevent 
any definitive conclusions.
40  The regressions also indicate that federal banks have worse 
performance than privately owned domestic banks, while foreign-owned have lower overhead 
costs, but also lower ROA and ROE than privately owned domestic banks.  Further, larger 
banks have lower overhead costs; banks with a higher share of fixed assets have lower returns 
on assets and equity, while banks with a larger share of savings deposits have higher overhead 
costs.   
We find strong evidence that privatization by state governments and federalization has 
significant effects on performance, increasing ROA and ROE and decreasing overhead costs.  
                                                 
40 Of course, there is the possibility that there is a correlation between under-reporting of losses and true 
financial situation of these banks, which could explain that we do not have any significant differences between 
state banks that went through different transformation options.    23
In the case of privatization by the federal government, most of the improvement follows 
federalization; there is only limited evidence of a further increase in ROA and ROE (only in 
the robust regressions) and no evidence of further decreases in overhead costs after 
privatization.
41  There is evidence of performance improvements through restructuring of state 
banks; however, this evidence is not robust across different estimation techniques, most likely 
caused by measurement error in the timing of the restructuring.  Finally, we note that there is 
not much difference in coefficient size and significance in the ROE and ROA regressions that 
exclude and include overhead costs/assets, so that any performance improvements were 
beyond cost efficiency gains. 
Did transformation close the initial gap to privately owned domestic banks?  The tests 
in Panel B of Table 5 suggest differences in the extent to which the different options had 
success in making up for the initial underperformance of state banks.  First, the federalization 
and subsequent privatization increased returns on assets and equity beyond that of privately 
owned domestic banks, but did not help reduce overhead costs from their initially high level. 
Second, in the case of state banks privatized by the states, privatization could not make up for 
the initially low ROE, but improved ROA and lowered overhead costs beyond the initially 
low level. Third, there is not consistent evidence on the success of federalization beyond the 
original underperformance; while most tests enter significantly, the signs differ across 
different estimation methods.  Finally, the restructuring of state banks could not make up for 
the initial underperformance. 
Restructuring state banks seemed to have been the least successful option, while we 
cannot find significant differences between the other alternatives.  The tests in Panel B of 
Table 5 indicate that restructuring led to lower increases in ROA than privatization by the 
                                                 
41 Note, however, that both dummy variables enter jointly significantly in all but one regression.   24
federal or state government. Restructuring led to less reduction in overhead costs than in the 
case of federalization (with pending privatization) and privatization by the state.   
The results in Panel A of Table 6 suggest continuous performance improvements in 
the cases of state banks that were federalized, federalized and privatized and privatized by the 
state, but not in the case of restructured banks.  Time since Privatization after Federalization 
enters significantly and positively in the ROA and ROE regressions, but insignificantly in the 
overhead costs regressions; Time since Privatization and Time since Federalization enter 
significantly and positively (negatively) in the ROA (overhead costs) regressions.  Time since 
Restructuring, on the other hand, does not enter significantly in any regression.  In many 
regressions, the Time since variable “crowds out” the Action variable; Privatized after 
Federalized, Privatized and Federalized often enter insignificantly.   This indicates that there 
was a slow continuing improvement in efficiency and performance rather than a one-time 
jump. 
The results in Table 6 Panel B suggest that two years after the privatization or 
restructuring, only privatization by the federal government led to improvements in returns on 
assets and equity beyond the gap to privately owned domestic banks, while still not making 
up for the initially high overhead costs.  Here we evaluate the effect of different PROES 
options two years after the action. As in Table 5B, we find that federalization and 
privatization increases returns on assets and equity beyond the initially low level.  In the case 
of privatization by the state, we find an improvement beyond the initial gap to privately 
owned domestic banks only in the case of overhead costs, while there is no improvement in 
ROE beyond the initially low level. Unlike the regressions of Table 5, here we do not find any 
consistent evidence for the ROA regressions.  In the case of federalization (with pending   25
privatization), we cannot find any consistent evidence across the different estimation 
techniques. Restructuring, on the other hand, has not helped make up for initially low 
performance.  
The tests in Panel B of Table 6 suggest that restructuring was the least successful 
PROES options.  Restructured state banks show less improvement in ROA than other 
transformed state banks and less reduction in overhead costs than privatized and federalized 
banks.  We also find evidence that privatization by the federal government led to greater 
improvement in ROA than privatization by the state government.  
We assessed the robustness of our bank-level results along several dimensions.  First, 
we re-ran the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 using clustered errors.
 42   While the coefficient 
estimates are the same as under OLS regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6, the regressions 
in Table 7 control for correlations between error terms for individual banks.  While the 
significance of many coefficients decreases, our main findings are confirmed when we use 
clustered error terms.   
We also tested the robustness of our results to the number of periods we drop after the 
PROES action.  Specifically, we re-ran all regressions, dropping no period and one period 
after federalization, privatization or restructuring.    Again, our main results are confirmed.  
We also re-ran our regressions controlling for changes in ownership unrelated to 
PROES (mostly M&A activity between private banks) and other jumps in the data that we 
cannot account for.  Even after controlling for these potential sources of measurement error, 
our main findings are again confirmed.  
                                                 
42 See Deaton (1997, pp. 73-78) for a detailed discussion of clustering.  Also, see Huber (1967) and Rogers 
(1993).   26
Finally, we assessed the absolute and relative success of the different PROES options 
at time periods other than two years after action. When we evaluate the success of the 
different options at three years after transformation, both relative to the initially low 
performance and efficiency and relative to each other, we confirm our main findings. 
 
6. Conclusions 
  The transformation of state-owned banks in Brazil, to most observers, was part of a 
larger process of banking reform in the wake of the Real Plan, and indeed part of an even 
larger process of privatization.  But it also had unique features that distinguish it.  State banks, 
more than other government-owned firms, had long served as machines for patronage and 
political rents.  They required repeated bailouts and had poor operating ratios and dismal 
efficiency.  The central role of financial intermediation in economic development made the 
transformation of state banks especially important.  
  This paper evaluated the program of state bank transformation in the late 1990s, 
analyzing both the factors explaining the options that state governments chose for their banks, 
as well as the effects of the different transformation options on performance.  We find that 
political economy theories can explain states’ choices best.  The stronger the dependence on 
budget transfers from the federal government, the more likely a state is to agree to liquidation 
or privatization directly by the federal government.  States that had other patronage tools in 
the form of development agencies and whose banks were already under federal control were 
also more likely to agree to give up control over their bank.  Interestingly, economic and 
social factors cannot explain the government choices made under PROES.     27
  We find a significant performance improvement for privatized and federalized banks, 
but not for restructured banks.  Though we face measurement errors in the case of restructured 
banks, we interpret this as evidence in favor of states relinquishing ownership control over 
their banks.  These conclusions are further supported by tests revealing that restructuring 
seemed to be the least successful transformation method, when compared with the other 
options, and when measured both over the sample period and at specific points after the 
transformation process took place.      28
References 
Amorim Neto, Octavio (2002): Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition 
Discipline in Brazil, in: Scott Mogenstern et al (Eds.):  Legislative Politics in Latin 
America (Cambridge, UK) 
Baer, Werner and Nader Nazmi (2002): Privatization and Restructuring of Banks in Brazil, 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 40, 3-24. 
Barth, James R.; Caprio, Gerard Jr.; Levine, Ross (2004): Bank Supervision and Regulation: 
What Works Best?, Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 205-48. 
Baumohl Weintraub; Nakane, Marcio I. (2005): Bank Privatization and Productivity: 
Evidence for Brazil, Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming. 
Beck, Thorsten; Cull, Robert; Jerome, Afeikhena T. (2005): Bank Privatization and 
Performance: Evidence from Nigeria, Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming. 
Berger, Allen N.; Clarke, George; Cull, Robert; Klapper, Leora; Udell, Gregory F. (2005): 
Governance and the Efficiency of Commercial Banks: Evidence from the Argentine 
Banking System, Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming. 
Bevilaqua, Afonso S. (1999): State-Government Bailouts in Brazil, Catholic University of Rio 
de Janeiro, mimeo. 
Biais, Bruno; Perotti, Enrico (2002): Machiavellian Privatization, American Economic Review 
92, 240-58. 
Boehmer, Ekkehart; Nash, Robert; Netter, Jeffry M. (2005): Bank Privatization in Developing 
and Developed Countries: Cross-Sectional Evidence on the Impact of Economic and 
Political Factors, Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming.  
Clarke, George; Cull, Robert (1999): Why Privatize? The Case of Argentina’s Public 
Provincial Banks, World Development 27, 867- 888. 
Clarke, George; Cull, Robert (2002): Political and Economic Determinants of the Likelihood 
of Privatizing Argentine Public Banks, Journal of Law and Economics 45, 165-197. 
Cull, Robert; Matesova, Jana; Shirley, Mary (2002): Ownership and the Temptation to Loot: 
Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic, Journal of Comparative 
Economics 30, 1-24. 
Deaton, Angus. (1997): The Analysis of Household Surveys.  Baltimore, Maryland: John 
Hopkins Academic Press. 
Dinc, Serdar (2005): Politicians and Banks: Political Influence on Government-Owned Banks 
in Emerging Countries, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
Folha de São Paulo, several issues. 
Franco, Gustavo H.B. (1995) O Plano Real e Outros Ensaios (Rio de Janeiro, 1995) 
______________. (2000).  The Real Plan and the Exchange Rate.  (Essays in International 
Finance n. 217) (Princeton, 2000).   29
Huber, Peter J. (1967). "The Behavior of Maximum-Likelihood Estimates under Non-
Standard Conditions." In Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium in 
Mathematical Statistics and Probability, edited by Lucien M. Le Cam and J. Neyman, 
pp. 221-233. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.  
La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes; Shleifer, Andrei (2002): Government Ownership of 
Commercial Banks, Journal of Finance 57, 265-301. 
Lundberg, Eduardo (1999): Saneamento do Sistema Financeiro—A Experiência Brasileira 
dos Últimos 25 Anos.(mimeo, Banco Central do Brasil). 
Maia, Geraldo (1998): Restructuring the Banking System – the Case of Brazil, in BIS Policy 
Papers no. 6—August 1999 (Basil, Bank for International Settlements).  
McQuerry, Elizabeth (2001): Managed Care for Brazil’s Banks, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta Economic Review, Second Quarter, 27-44. 
Mendonça de Barros, José, Gustavo Loyola, and Joel Bogdanski (1997): Restructuring of the 
Financial Sector, mimeo. 
Ness, Walter L., Jr. (2000): Reducing Government Bank Presence in the Brazilian Financial 
System: Why and How, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 40, 71-84. 
Nicolau, Jairo Marconi (20020): Dados Eleitorais do Brasil, 1982- 2002 (edição eletrônica), 
http://www.iuperj.br/deb/port/ 
Olley, G.; Pakes, A. (1996): The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications 
Equipment Industry, Econometrica 64, 1263-97. 
Perotti, Enrico C. (1995): Credible Privatization, American Economic Review 85, 847-59. 
Pinheiro, Armando Castelar; Cabral, Celia (1998): Credit Markets in Brazil: The Role of 
Judicial Enforcement and Other Institutions, Ensaios BNDES 9. 
Rogers, William. H. (1993). “Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples.” Stata 
Technical Bulletin Reprints 3, 88-94. 
Siqueira, Francisco José de (nd.): Instituições Financeiras: Regimes Especiais no Direito 
Brasileiro (mimeo, Banco Central do Brasil). 
Sola, Lourdes; Garman, Christopher da Cunha Bueno; Marques, Moisés S. (2001): Central 
Banking Reform and Overcoming the Moral Hazard Problem: The Case of Brazil, 
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 21, 40-64. 
   30
Table 1: Ownership Structure of the Brazilian Banking System 
 
  1994  1995 1996  1997 1998  1999 
Private Banks  41.21  39.16  39  36.76  35.29  33.11 
Foreign Banks  7.16  8.39  9.79  12.82  18.38  23.19 
Public  Banks  51.43  52.21 50.91  50.05 45.83  43.04 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil.  A bank is defined as private, foreign or public according to its majority shareholder.   31
 
Table 2: Transformation and Status of State Banks 
 
STATE INSTITUTION  STATUS 
ACRE BANACRE  Liquidated  (Remainder  converted to Development Agency) 
ALAGOAS PRODUBAN  Liquidated  (Remainder converted to Development Agency) 
AMAPA  BANAP  Liquidated   
AMAZONAS BEA  Federalized  and  Privatized (bought by BRADESCO) 
BANEB  Privatized (bought by BRADESCO)  BAHIA 
 
DESENBANCO  Converted to Development Agency in 2001 
CEARA  BEC  Federalized; Intended for privatization, not yet privatized 
DISTRITO FEDERAL  BRB  Opted out of PROES 
BANESTES  Restructured; State Gov't trying to privatize bank, but stalled in scandal  ESPIRITO SANTO 
 
BANDES  Opted out of PROES 
 GOIAS  BEG  Federalized and Privatized (bought by Itaú) 
MARANHAO BEM  Federalized;  Intended for privatization, not yet privatized 
MATO GROSSO  BEMAT  Liquidated, in process of conversion to Development Agency 
MATO GROSSO DO SUL  -   
CREDIREAL  Privatized (bought by BRADESCO and BCN) 
BDMG  Restructured; kept by State  
BEMGE  Privatized (bought by Itaú) 
MINAS GERAIS 
 
MINASCAIXA  Liquidated (process began in 1991 for MINASCAIXA) 
PARA  BANPARA  Restructured; kept by State Gov’t (portion converted to Development Agency)
PARAIBA  PARAIBAN  Opted out of PROES; auctioned by State Government to ABN Amro 
PARANA  BANESTADO  Privatized (bought by Itaú) 
PERNAMBUCO  BANDEPE  Privatized (bought by ABN) 
PIAUI  BEP  Federalized; Intended for privatization, not yet privatized 
RIO DE JANEIRO  BANERJ  Privatized (bought by Itaú) 
BANDERN Liquidated  RIO GRANDE DO NORTE 
 
BDRN Liquidated 
BANRISUL  Restructured; kept by State Government  RIO GRANDE DO SUL 
 
CEE-RS Liquidated 
BERON Liquidated  RONDONIA 
 
RONDONPOUP Liquidated 
RORAIMA BANER    Liquidated 
BESC  Federalized; Intended for privatization, not yet privatized  SANTA CATARINA 
 
BADESC  Converted to Development Agency 
BANESPA  Privatized (bought by Santander)  SAO PAULO 
 
NOSSA CAIXA/NOSSO BANCO  Restructured; kept by State Government 
SERGIPE BANESE  Restructured;  kept by State Government 
TOCANTINS -   
 
SOURCES: drawn principally from Folha de São Paulo, Estado de São Paulo, Jornal do Comércio, Correio 
Brasiliense.   32
Table 3: Political Economy vs. Development: What Predicts State Bank Transformation? 
 Transformation TransformationTransformationTransformationTransformation  Transformation Transformation Transformation Transformation Transformation
DFI  -2.336 -2.597 -2.294 -2.369 -2.296 -2.999 -2.304 -2.191 -2.142 -2.101 
  (3.18)*** (3.19)*** (3.07)**  (3.37)*** (3.23)*** (3.64)*** (3.15)*** (2.70)*** (2.66)*** (2.56)** 
RAET  -3.028 -3.323 -2.696 -3.127 -2.867 -3.223 -3.099 -2.888 -2.867 -2.501 
  (3.29)*** (3.56)*** (4.02)*** (3.67)*** (3.14)*** (3.81)*** (3.23)*** (2.77)*  (2.43)**  (2.46)** 
Share  of  transfers  -5.946 -6.092 -7.080 -5.525 -6.077 -7.671 -5.942 -5.545 -5.387 -5.021 
  (4.92)*** (4.78)*** (2.28)**  (2.76)**  (5.02)*** (4.02)*** (4.95)*** (3.39)*** (3.02)*** (2.75)** 
Deficit/GDP   -40.206          
   (1.92)*          
Poverty  rate    0.018         
    ( 0 . 5 9 )          
Log  (GDP  per  capita)     0.218        
     ( 0 . 2 7 )         
Share  of  agricultural  production      0.029       
      ( 0 . 6 5 )        
Share of Senate seats PSDB            -3.364         
       (1.66)*      
Share of Senate seats President’s Coalition              -0.265       
        ( 0 . 2 9 )      
Return  on  assets         -5.137    
         ( 0 . 5 4 )     
Overhead  costs/assets          -0.784   
          ( 0 . 0 8 )    
Savings deposits/assets              4.374 
             ( 1 . 4 3 )  
Observations  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 19 19 19 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.458 0.480 0.466 0.459 0.464 0.527 0.456 0.358 0.356 0.379 
 
Regressions are run with ordered probit.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
No 
observations  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max  1
st percentile 99
th percentile
           
Return on equity  4809  -0.13 0.03 2.30 -61.12 6.74 -2.58 0.27
Return on assets  4810  0.00 0.00 0.04 -1.24 0.37 -0.13 0.07
Overhead costs/Assets  4820  0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0.69 0.00 0.10
Assets (in millions)  4820  5,387 642 17,495 2 213,412 7.73 108,428
Saving deposits/assets  4820  0.03 0.00 0.07 0 0.48 0.00 0.32
Fixed assets/assets  4820  0.08 0.04 0.11 0 0.98 0.00 0.63
Eventually Federalized and Privatized  4820  0.02 0 0.13 0 1 0 1
Federalized before Privatization  4820  0.01 0 0.11 0 1 0 1
Privatized after federalization  4820  0.00 0 0.06 0 1 0 0
Time since privatization after federalization  4820  0.02 0 0.38 0 10 0 0
Eventually Privatized  4820  0.04 0 0.20 0 1 0 1
Privatized 4820  0.02 0 0.14 0 1 0 1
Time since privatization   4820  0.21 0 1.71 0 23 0 10
Eventually Federalized  4820  0.02 0 0.15 0 1 0 1
Federalized 4820  0.01 0 0.10 0 1 0 0
Time since federalization  4820  0.07 0 0.82 0 16 0 0
Eventually Restructured  4820  0.03 0 0.17 0 1 0 1
Restructured 4820  0.01 0 0.12 0 1 0 1
Time since restructuring  4820  0.15 0 1.41 0 21 0 7
Federal bank  4820  0.03 0 0.18 0 1 0 1
Foreign bank  4820  0.34 0 0.47 0 1 0 1
Non participating state bank  4820  0.01 0 0.08 0 1 0 0
   34












Return on assets  0.59**  1         
Overhead costs/assets  -0.31***  -0.24**  1       
Assets  0.02 0.00 -0.10*       
Savings  deposits/assets  -0.11*** -0.09*** 0.13***  0.35***       
Fixed  assets/assets  -0.04*** -0.08*** 0.09**  -0.02  0.00     
Eventually Federalized and Privatized  0.00 0.00 0.06***  0.07***  0.12***  -0.04*** 
Federalized before Privatization  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.1***  0.07***  -0.04** 
Privatized  after  federalization  0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03*  0.04***  -0.02 
Time since privatization after federalization  0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03**  0.04***  -0.02 
Eventually  Privatized  -0.08*** -0.04*** 0.1***  -0.02  0.30**  -0.01 
Privatized 0.00  0.03**  -0.02  -0.02  0.22**  0.02 
Time since privatization   0.01  0.03**  -0.04*  -0.02  0.18***  0.02 
Eventually  Federalized  -0.08*** -0.07*** 0.15**  -0.04***  0.15**  -0.04** 
Federalized  0.00  -0.02 0.04* -0.03*  0.14*** -0.04*** 
Time since federalization  0.00  -0.02  0.04***  -0.02  0.15***  -0.04*** 
Eventually  Restructured  -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.04***  0.00  0.43**  -0.04*** 
Restructured  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.29***  -0.04*** 
Time  since  restructuring  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.25***  -0.04*** 
Federal  bank  0.01  -0.01 -0.02 0.61***  0.18*** -0.03** 
Foreign bank  0.02*  -0.03  -0.20*  -0.06***  -0.18***  -0.16*** 
Non participating state bank  0.00 0.00 0.07***  -0.02  0.17***  0.01 
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Table 5: State bank transformation and performance 






















Log  of  Assets  0.0034  -0.0008 -0.0047 0.0022  -0.0012 0.0030  -0.0006 -0.0021 0.0025  -0.0006 
  (0.76)  (1.51)  (5.55)*** (0.48)  (2.36)**  (2.69)*** (2.79)*** (8.13)*** (2.24)**  (2.53)** 
Eventually Federalized and Privatized  -0.1575  -0.0151 0.0159  -0.1533 -0.0136 -0.0320 -0.0089 0.0147  -0.0313 -0.0090 
  (2.55)**  (3.56)*** (3.29)*** (2.49)**  (3.20)*** (3.51)*** (5.03)*** (6.86)*** (3.43)*** (5.10)*** 
Federalized before Privatization  0.1462  0.0124 -0.0053  0.1448 0.0117 0.0454 0.0087 -0.0068  0.0456 0.0088 
  (2.31)** (2.65)***  (0.98)  (2.29)** (2.52)** (3.91)***  (3.88)***  (2.49)** (3.93)***  (3.91)*** 
Privatized after Federalization  0.0375  0.0079 -0.0040  0.0364 0.0075 0.0521 0.0109 -0.0003  0.0510 0.0110 
  (1.04) (1.38) (1.02) (1.01) (1.33) (3.98)***  (4.33)***  (0.10) (3.91)***  (4.35)*** 
Eventually  Privatized  -0.2301 -0.0159 0.0139  -0.2264 -0.0148 -0.0302 -0.0070 0.0083  -0.0281 -0.0071 
  (4.62)*** (5.93)*** (5.47)*** (4.54)*** (5.69)*** (5.42)*** (6.54)*** (6.31)*** (5.03)*** (6.57)*** 
Privatized        0.1913 0.0174 -0.0178  0.1866 0.0160 0.0194 0.0110 -0.0119  0.0166 0.0112 
  (3.37)*** (5.34)*** (5.68)*** (3.27)*** (5.06)*** (2.89)*** (8.53)*** (7.55)*** (2.46)**  (8.61)*** 
Eventually  Federalized    -0.1659 -0.0175 0.0186  -0.1609 -0.0158 -0.0258 -0.0053 0.0227  -0.0238 -0.0055 
  (2.61)*** (5.18)*** (8.70)*** (2.57)**  (4.75)*** (4.60)*** (4.92)*** (17.22)***  (4.21)*** (5.06)*** 
Federalized        0.1639 0.0164 -0.0198  0.1586 0.0146 0.0275 0.0039 -0.0182  0.0253 0.0041 
  (2.57)**  (4.37)*** (6.14)*** (2.52)**  (4.00)*** (3.11)*** (2.29)**  (8.74)*** (2.86)*** (2.39)** 
Eventually  Restructured  -0.1416 -0.0071 0.0001  -0.1415 -0.0071 -0.0224 -0.0034 0.0008  -0.0229 -0.0033 
  (2.26)**  (2.58)*** (0.07)  (2.26)**  (2.59)*** (3.56)*** (2.78)*** (0.54)  (3.65)*** (2.73)*** 
Restructured  0.1309 0.0046 -0.0045  0.1297 0.0042 0.0214 0.0004 -0.0022  0.0214 0.0004 
  (2.24)** (1.87)*  (2.32)** (2.23)** (1.74)*  (2.76)***  (0.29)  (1.19)  (2.77)***  (0.29) 
Federal  bank  -0.0917 -0.0046 0.0095  -0.0892 -0.0039 -0.0274 -0.0020 0.0069  -0.0264 -0.0020 
  (4.05)*** (4.45)*** (8.50)*** (3.90)*** (3.74)*** (6.48)*** (2.42)**  (6.93)*** (6.25)*** (2.51)** 
Foreign-owned  bank  -0.0419 -0.0047 -0.0025 -0.0425 -0.0049 -0.0119 -0.0025 -0.0016 -0.0123 -0.0025 
  (6.32)*** (7.42)*** (3.97)*** (6.44)*** (7.75)*** (7.68)*** (8.46)*** (4.49)*** (7.95)*** (8.34)*** 
Not participating state bank  -0.0150  -0.0028  0.0156  -0.0109 -0.0015 -0.0286 -0.0044 0.0192  -0.0267 -0.0046 
  (0.85) (1.59) (12.91)***  (0.61) (0.88) (3.30)***  (2.65)***  (9.41)***  (3.08)***  (2.77)*** 
Saving  deposits/assets  -0.1467 -0.0146 0.0778  -0.1260 -0.0085 -0.0418 -0.0045 0.0727  -0.0321 -0.0054 
  (1.86)* (3.21)***  (19.65)***  (1.55)  (1.89)* (3.06)***  (1.71)* (22.67)***  (2.32)**  (2.01)**   36






















Fixed  assets/assets  -0.1461 -0.0185 -0.0023 -0.1468 -0.0186 -0.0359 -0.0027 -0.0011 -0.0360 -0.0028 
  (4.92)*** (3.86)*** (0.73)  (4.96)*** (3.95)*** (5.62)*** (2.21)**  (0.76)  (5.64)*** (2.27)** 
Overhead  costs/assets     -0.2655  -0.0786     -0.1233  0.0122 
     (1.37)  (3.81)***     (3.62)***  (2.06)** 
Constant  0.0262 0.0223 0.0938 0.0511 0.0299 -0.0091  0.0174 0.0474 0.0009 0.0164 
  (0.34) (2.30)**  (6.19)***  (0.65) (3.26)***  (0.47) (4.53)***  (10.30)***  (0.04) (4.22)*** 
Observations  4715 4720 4715 4715 4720 4809 4810 4820 4808 4810 
R-squared  0.08 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.37 0.08 0.08 
Panel B:            
Bridging the gap?            
Federalized and Privatized  0.0262***  0.0052***  0.0066**  0.0279*** 0.0056*** 0.0655*** 0.0107*** 0.0076*** 0.0653*** 0.0108*** 
Privatized  -0.0388*** 0.0015***  -0.0039*** -0.0398*** 0.0012***  -0.0108*** 0.004***  -0.0036*** -0.0115*** 0.0041*** 
Federalized  -0.002***  -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0023*** -0.0012*** 0.0017***  -0.0014*** 0.0045***  0.0015***  -0.0014*** 
Restructured  -0.0107** -0.0025** -0.0044  -0.0118** -0.0029** -0.001*** -0.003*  -0.0014  -0.0015***  -0.0029 
            
Compare options            
Federalized w/ and w/o privatization  -0.0177  -0.004  0.0145**  -0.0138 -0.0029 0.0179  0.0048* 0.0114***  0.0203  0.0047* 
Privatized by federal vs. state govt  -0.0076  0.0029 0.0085 -0.0054  0.0032 0.0781***  0.0086***  0.0048 0.08***  0.0086*** 
Federalized and privatized vs. restructured 0.0528  0.0157**  -0.0048  0.0515  0.015**  0.0761*** 0.0192*** -0.0049  0.0752*** 0.0194*** 
Privatized  vs.  restructured  0.0604  0.0128*** -0.0133***  0.0569  0.0118*** -0.002  0.0106*** -0.0097***  -0.0048  0.0108*** 
Federalized  vs.  privatized  -0.0274  -0.001 -0.002 -0.028 -0.0014  0.0081 -0.0071***  -0.0063**  0.0087 -0.0071*** 
Federalized  vs.  restructured  0.033  0.0118***  -0.0153***  0.0289 0.0104**  0.0061 0.0035 -0.016***  0.0039 0.0037 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The tests in the panel Bridging the gap test for the difference between (i) Eventually 
Federalized and Privatized and Federalized before Privatization plus Privatized after Federalization, (ii) Eventually Privatized and Privatized, (iii) Eventually Federalized and Federalized and (iv) 
Eventually Restructured and Restructured.  The tests in the panel Compare options test for the difference between (i) Federalized before Privatization and Federalized, (ii) Federalized before 
Privatization plus Privatized after Federalization and Privatized, (iii) Federalized before Privatization plus Privatized after Federalization and Restructured, (iv) Privatized and Restructured,  (v) 
Federalized and Privatized, and (vi) Federalized and Restructured.   37
Table 6: State bank transformation and performance: effects over time 






















Log  of  Assets  0.0032  -0.0009 -0.0047 0.0020  -0.0012 0.0031  -0.0007 -0.0022 0.0027  -0.0006 
  (0.71)  (1.59)  (5.56)*** (0.43)  (2.42)**  (2.80)*** (3.26)*** (8.30)*** (2.37)**  (2.94)*** 
Eventually Federalized and Privatized  -0.1581  -0.0152 0.0159  -0.1540 -0.0138 -0.0314 -0.0092 0.0147  -0.0307 -0.0094 
  (2.56)**  (3.59)*** (3.28)*** (2.50)**  (3.23)*** (3.46)*** (5.28)*** (6.87)*** (3.38)*** (5.36)*** 
Federalized before Privatization  0.1465  0.0124 -0.0051  0.1452 0.0118 0.0446 0.0090 -0.0067  0.0448 0.0091 
  (2.31)** (2.66)***  (0.96)  (2.30)** (2.53)** (3.85)***  (4.07)***  (2.44)** (3.87)***  (4.10)*** 
Privatized  after  Federalization  -0.1356 -0.0227 -0.0038 -0.1366 -0.0231 -0.0698 -0.0129 0.0050  -0.0703 -0.0129 
  (1.56) (1.91)*  (0.37) (1.58) (1.99)**  (2.21)**  (2.14)**  (0.68) (2.23)**  (2.14)** 
Time since Privatization after Federalization  0.0296 0.0052 -0.0001  0.0296 0.0052 0.0210 0.0044 -0.0009  0.0210 0.0044 
  (2.71)*** (3.17)*** (0.08)  (2.72)*** (3.22)*** (4.31)*** (4.69)*** (0.77)  (4.32)*** (4.70)*** 
Eventually  Privatized  -0.2304 -0.0160 0.0139  -0.2268 -0.0149 -0.0299 -0.0072 0.0083  -0.0280 -0.0073 
  (4.63)*** (5.95)*** (5.47)*** (4.55)*** (5.73)*** (5.39)*** (6.72)*** (6.36)*** (5.00)*** (6.78)*** 
Privatized    0.1704 0.0082 -0.0052  0.1691 0.0079 0.0191 0.0012 -0.0004  0.0177 0.0013 
  (2.67)***  (1.54) (1.34) (2.65)***  (1.53) (1.79)*  (0.60) (0.17) (1.65)*  (0.63) 
Time  since  Privatization    0.0020 0.0009 -0.0012  0.0017 0.0008 0.0000 0.0009 -0.0010  -0.0001  0.0009 
  (1.16)  (2.70)*** (6.92)*** (0.98)  (2.44)**  (0.04)  (6.03)*** (5.29)*** (0.09)  (6.13)*** 
Eventually  Federalized    -0.1660 -0.0175 0.0186  -0.1612 -0.0159 -0.0257 -0.0054 0.0227  -0.0238 -0.0056 
  (2.61)*** (5.19)*** (8.70)*** (2.57)**  (4.78)*** (4.60)*** (5.00)*** (17.29)***  (4.22)*** (5.19)*** 
Federalized  0.1273 0.0086 -0.0077  0.1253 0.0077 0.0007 -0.0014  -0.0073  0.0003 -0.0013 
  (1.92)*  (2.16)**  (1.48) (1.91)*  (2.00)**  (0.04) (0.43) (1.80)*  (0.02) (0.41) 
Time  since  Federalization  0.0048 0.0010 -0.0016  0.0044 0.0009 0.0036 0.0007 -0.0015  0.0034 0.0007 
  (1.83)*  (3.67)*** (3.03)*** (1.70)*  (3.47)*** (1.89)*  (1.97)**  (3.46)*** (1.77)*  (2.04)** 
Eventually  Restructured  -0.1414 -0.0071 -0.0000 -0.1415 -0.0071 -0.0216 -0.0035 0.0007  -0.0221 -0.0034 
  (2.25)**  (2.56)**  (0.03)  (2.26)**  (2.58)*** (3.45)*** (2.92)*** (0.51)  (3.54)*** (2.87)*** 
Restructured  0.0886 0.0037 -0.0048  0.0874 0.0033 0.0062 -0.0004  -0.0016  0.0065 -0.0004 
  (1.21) (1.41) (1.86)*  (1.20) (1.28) (0.46) (0.16) (0.51) (0.48) (0.16) 
Time  since  Restructuring  0.0041 0.0001 0.0000 0.0041 0.0001 0.0014 0.0001 -0.0001  0.0014 0.0001 
  (1.19) (0.81) (0.10) (1.19) (0.81) (1.35) (0.44) (0.25) (1.33) (0.44) 
Federal  bank  -0.0917 -0.0046 0.0094  -0.0892 -0.0039 -0.0272 -0.0020 0.0069  -0.0263 -0.0021 
  (4.04)*** (4.44)*** (8.47)*** (3.90)*** (3.75)*** (6.46)*** (2.48)**  (6.93)*** (6.24)*** (2.60)*** 
Foreign-owned  bank  -0.0418 -0.0047 -0.0025 -0.0425 -0.0049 -0.0119 -0.0025 -0.0016 -0.0123 -0.0025 
  (6.32)*** (7.41)*** (3.96)*** (6.43)*** (7.74)*** (7.73)*** (8.59)*** (4.46)*** (7.98)*** (8.44)***   38






















Not participating state bank  -0.0148  -0.0027  0.0154  -0.0108 -0.0015 -0.0279  -0.0045 0.0191  -0.0260  -0.0048 
  (0.83) (1.55) (13.02)***  (0.60) (0.87) (3.23)***  (2.73)***  (9.39)***  (3.02)***  (2.87)*** 
Saving  deposits/assets  -0.1483 -0.0150 0.0789  -0.1278 -0.0091 -0.0459  -0.0039 0.0732  -0.0365  -0.0050 
  (1.87)*  (3.29)***  (21.04)***  (1.56) (2.00)**  (3.36)***  (1.49) (22.75)***  (2.63)***  (1.88)* 
Fixed  assets/assets  -0.1463 -0.0186 -0.0023  -0.1469 -0.0186 -0.0359  -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.0359  -0.0033 
  (4.92)*** (3.87)*** (0.71)  (4.97)*** (3.96)*** (5.64)***  (2.59)*** (0.56)  (5.64)***  (2.69)*** 
Overhead  costs/assets      -0.2593  -0.0760      -0.1194  0.0151 
      (1.34)  (3.71)***      (3.51)***  (2.56)** 
Constant  0.0303 0.0230 0.0940  0.0547 0.0304 -0.0107  0.0187 0.0480 -0.0027  0.0174 
  (0.39) (2.39)**  (6.19)***  (0.69) (3.32)***  (0.55)  (4.90)***  (10.45)***  (0.13)  (4.52)*** 
Observations  4715 4720 4715  4715 4720 4809  4810 4820 4808  4810 
R-squared  0.08 0.06 0.25  0.08 0.07 0.08  0.10 0.38 0.09  0.10 
Panel B:             
Bridging the gap after 8 quarters?             
Federalized and Privatized  0.0896*** 0.0161*** 0.0062*** 0.0914*** 0.0165*** 0.1114*** 0.0221*** 0.0058*** 0.1118*** 0.022***
Privatized -0.044*** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0441*** -0.0006*** -0.0108***  0.0012*** -0.0001*** -0.0111*** 0.0012***
Federalized -0.0003*** -0.0009*** -0.0019*** -0.0007*** -0.001*** 0.0038***  -0.0012*** 0.0034*** 0.0037*** -0.0013***
Restructured -0.02** -0.0026** -0.0048 -0.0213** -0.003** -0.0042***  -0.0031 -0.0017 -0.0044*** -0.003
             
Compare options after 8 quarters             
Privatized by federal vs. state govt  0.0613 0.0159** 0.0051 0.0627 0.016** 0.1237*** 0.0229*** -0.0005 0.1256*** 0.0229***
Federalized and privatized vs. restructured  0.1263 0.0268*** -0.0049 0.1252 0.0262*** 0.1254*** 0.0309*** -0.0065 0.1248*** 0.031***
Privatized vs. restructured  0.065 0.0109** -0.01*** 0.0625 0.0102** 0.0017  0.008*** -0.006** -0.0008 0.0081***
Federalized vs. privatized  -0.0207 0.0012 -0.0057 -0.0222 0.0006 0.0104  -0.0042** -0.0109*** 0.0106 -0.0042*
Federalized vs. restructured  0.0443 0.0121*** -0.0157*** 0.0403 0.0108** 0.0121  0.0038* -0.0169*** 0.0098 0.0039*
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The tests in the panel Bridging the gap test for the difference between (i) Eventually 
Federalized and Privatized and Federalized before Privatization plus Privatized after Federalization plus 8* Time since privatization after Federalization, (ii) Eventually Privatized and Privatized plus 
8*Time since Privatization, (iii) Eventually Federalized and Federalized plus 8*Time since Federalization and (iv) Eventually Restructured and Restructured plus 8*Time since Restructuring.  The tests 
in the panel Compare options test for the difference between (i) Federalized before Privatization plus Privatized after Federalization plus 8*Time since Privatization after Federalization and Privatized 
plus 8*Time since Privatization, (ii) Federalized before Privatization plus Privatized after Federalization plus 8*Time since Privatization after Federalization and Restructured plus 8*Time since 
Restructuring, (iii) Privatized plus 8*Time since Privatization and Restructured plus 8*Time since Restructuring,  (iv) Federalized plus 8*Time since Federalization and Privatized plus 8*Time since 
Privatization, and (v) Federalized plus 8*Time since Federalization and Restructured plus 8*Time since Restructuring.   39






















Assets  0.0034  0.0032  -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0047 -0.0047 0.0022  0.0020  -0.0012 -0.0012 
  (0.48) (0.45) (1.31) (1.41) (2.85)***  (2.87)***  (0.30) (0.27) (1.97)**  (2.07)** 
Eventually Federalized and Privatized  -0.1575  -0.1581 -0.0151 -0.0152 0.0159  0.0159  -0.1533 -0.1540 -0.0136 -0.0138 
  (3.89)*** (3.93)*** (7.43)*** (7.67)*** (1.59)  (1.58)  (3.85)*** (3.88)*** (6.16)*** (6.34)*** 
Federalized before Privatization  0.1462  0.1465 0.0124 0.0124 -0.0053  -0.0051  0.1448 0.1452 0.0117 0.0118 
  (3.49)*** (3.53)*** (6.38)*** (6.69)*** (0.52)  (0.50)  (3.57)*** (3.60)*** (7.19)*** (7.48)*** 
Privatized after Federalization  0.0375  -0.1356  0.0079  -0.0227 -0.0040 -0.0038 0.0364  -0.1366 0.0075  -0.0231 
  (0.73) (1.66)*  (1.21) (1.38) (0.83) (0.25) (0.72) (1.71)*  (1.19) (1.47) 
Time since privatization after federalization   0.0296   0.0052   -0.0001   0.0296   0.0052 
   (4.76)***   (3.11)***   (0.06)   (4.93)***   (3.26)*** 
Eventually  Privatized  -0.2301 -0.2304 -0.0159 -0.0160 0.0139  0.0139  -0.2264 -0.2268 -0.0148 -0.0149 
  (3.81)*** (3.81)*** (5.88)*** (5.87)*** (2.47)**  (2.46)**  (3.76)*** (3.77)*** (5.59)*** (5.60)*** 
Privatized    0.1913 0.1704 0.0174 0.0082 -0.0178  -0.0052  0.1866 0.1691 0.0160 0.0079 
  (2.65)***  (2.14)** (10.00)***  (1.61)  (2.59)** (0.75)  (2.60)***  (2.13)** (8.96)***  (1.59) 
Time  since  privatization     0.0020   0.0009   -0.0012   0.0017   0.0008 
   (1.07)   (2.42)**   (6.95)***   (0.89)   (2.14)** 
Eventually  Federalized        -0.1659 -0.1660 -0.0175 -0.0175 0.0186  0.0186  -0.1609 -0.1612 -0.0158 -0.0159 
  (2.25)**  (2.25)**  (5.37)*** (5.35)*** (4.64)*** (4.60)*** (2.23)**  (2.23)**  (5.04)*** (5.05)*** 
Federalized  0.1639 0.1273 0.0164 0.0086 -0.0198  -0.0077  0.1586 0.1253 0.0146 0.0077 
  (2.68)*** (1.82)*  (7.45)*** (3.51)*** (4.06)*** (1.65)  (2.61)*** (1.78)*  (7.52)*** (3.43)*** 
Time  since  Federalization   0.0048   0.0010   -0.0016   0.0044   0.0009 
   (1.93)*   (4.19)***   (2.89)***   (1.74)*   (3.79)*** 
Eventually  Restructured  -0.1416 -0.1414 -0.0071 -0.0071 0.0001  -0.0000 -0.1415 -0.1415 -0.0071 -0.0071 
  (1.24) (1.24) (1.81)*  (1.82)*  (0.02) (0.01) (1.25) (1.25) (1.97)**  (1.97)** 
Restructured  0.1309 0.0886 0.0046 0.0037 -0.0045  -0.0048  0.1297 0.0874 0.0042 0.0033 
  (1.25) (0.82) (1.46) (1.37) (0.90) (0.83) (1.24) (0.81) (1.44) (1.31) 
Time  since  restructuring   0.0041   0.0001   0.0000   0.0041   0.0001 
   (2.55)**   (0.95)   (0.08)   (2.55)**   (0.98) 
Federal  bank  -0.0917 -0.0917 -0.0046 -0.0046 0.0095  0.0094  -0.0892 -0.0892 -0.0039 -0.0039 
  (2.81)*** (2.82)*** (2.61)*** (2.63)*** (3.11)*** (3.10)*** (2.68)*** (2.68)*** (2.18)**  (2.20)** 
Foreign-owned  bank  -0.0419 -0.0418 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0425 -0.0425 -0.0049 -0.0049 
  (2.39)** (2.39)** (3.85)***  (3.85)***  (1.37)  (1.36)  (2.44)** (2.44)** (3.99)***  (3.99)*** 






















Not participating state bank  -0.0150  -0.0148  -0.0028 -0.0027 0.0156  0.0154  -0.0109 -0.0108 -0.0015 -0.0015 
  (0.69) (0.68) (2.02)**  (2.10)**  (6.32)***  (6.60)***  (0.50) (0.49) (1.10) (1.13) 
Saving  deposits/assets  -0.1467 -0.1483 -0.0146 -0.0150 0.0778  0.0789  -0.1260 -0.1278 -0.0085 -0.0091 
  (1.27) (1.29) (2.17)**  (2.43)**  (6.53)***  (7.20)***  (1.09) (1.10) (1.33) (1.51) 
Fixed  assets/assets  -0.1461 -0.1463 -0.0185 -0.0186 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.1468 -0.1469 -0.0186 -0.0186 
  (2.31)** (2.32)** (1.80)*  (1.80)*  (0.26)  (0.26)  (2.34)** (2.34)** (1.83)*  (1.83)* 
Overhead  costs/assets        -0.2655  -0.2593  -0.0786  -0.0760 
        (1.28)  (1.25)  (2.30)**  (2.24)** 
Constant  0.0262 0.0303 0.0223 0.0230 0.0938 0.0940 0.0511 0.0547 0.0299 0.0304 
  (0.22) (0.26) (2.06)**  (2.18)**  (3.15)***  (3.16)***  (0.42) (0.45) (2.82)***  (2.93)*** 
Observations  4715 4715 4720 4720 4715 4715 4715 4715 4720 4720 
R-squared  0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
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Appendix A: Sources and Procedures for Constructing Measures of Partisan 
Influence 
 
Section 3 and Table 3 assess the bank transformation decision taken by states 
partly in terms of partisan political ties between each state’s key elected officials 
and the national executive.  Two types of ties are considered:  membership in the 
president’s political party (the PSDB), and membership in any one of the parties 
making up the president’s ruling coalition.
43  Three classes of elected officials 
from each state are taken into account:  the state governor, members of the state’s 
delegation to the federal Chamber of Deputies, and members of the state’s 
delegation to the federal Senate.  Sources indicating office holders and their party 
membership are varied, but most accessibly summarized in Nicolau (2002).  
Governors who served from 1995 through 1998 would have been those involved 
in the bulk of the transformation decisions, and their party affiliations were 
employed in constructing dichotomous variables indicating membership in the 
PSDB, and membership in Cardoso’s coalition.  Similarly, variables taking into 
account the share of each state’s cohort of federal deputies serving from 1995 
through 1998 who were members of the PSDB, and members of the president’s 
coalition, were constructed.  Unlike governors and deputies, senators in Brazil are 
elected for eight-year terms.  Senatorial elections are staggered in such a way that 
one senator from each state is elected, then four years later two others are elected.  
Those senators sitting from 1995 through 1998 (some of whom were elected in 
1990, the others in 1994) were used in creating measures of the proportion of each 
state’s senate delegation with membership in the PSDB, and the presidential 
coalition.  In all cases of office holders the slightly broader definition of the 
presidential coalition, which applied from early 1996 onward, was employed. 
 
                                                 
43 Amorim Neto reports the President’s coalition from January 1995 until April 1996 was made up 
of four parties: PSDB, PMDB, PFL, and PTC.  In April 1996 two more parties joined the coalition 
(the PPB and PPS); Amorim Neto (2002).    42
Appendix Table B: Variable definitions and sources 
 
Variable name  Definition  Primary Source 
Transformation  1 if the state bank was 
liquidated, 2 if the federal 
government took it over, 3 
if the state government 
privatized it; 4 if the bank 
was restructured and stayed 
in government ownership. 
Folha de São Paulo and 
Estado de São Paulo are the 
main sources.  Compare 
Table 2. 
DFI  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one if state 
established a development 
agency 
Banco Central do Brasil 
RAET  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one if the state 
bank was taken over by the 
federal government under 
the RAET 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Share of transfers  Share of transfers from 
federal government in state 
revenues, averaged over 
1995 to 2000. 
Ministerio da Fazenda  
Deficit/GDP  Ratio of state budget deficit 
to state GDP averaged over 
1995 to 2000. 
Ministerio da Fazenda 
Poverty rate  Share of population living 
below the poverty line 
averaged over 1995 to 2000 
IPEA 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita averaged 
over 1995 to 2000 
IBGE 
Share of agricultural 
production 
Share of agricultural 
production in state GDP 
averaged over 1995 to 2000 
IBGE 
Return on equity  Profits divided by total 
equity 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Return on assets  Profits divided by total 
assets 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Overhead costs/Assets  Total overhead costs 
divided by total assets 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Assets  Total assets in constant 
million Reais, deflated by 
CPI 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Savings deposits/assets  Savings deposit divided by 
total assets 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Fixed assets/assets  Fixed assets divided by 
total assets 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Eventually Federalized and 
Privatized 
Dummy variable that takes 
on value one for all banks 
Banco Central do Brasil   43
during the whole sample 
period that were federalized 
and privatized during the 
sample period 
Eventually Federalized  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one for all banks 
during the whole sample 
period that were 
federalized, but not 
privatized during the 
sample period 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Eventually Restructured  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one for all banks 
during the whole sample 
period that were 
restructured during the 
sample period 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Eventually Privatized  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one for all banks 
during the whole sample 
period that were privatized 
by the state government 
during the sample period 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Federalized before 
Privatization 
Dummy variable that takes 
on value one in the quarter 
when a bank that is 
subsequently privatized is 
federalized and all 
following quarters 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Privatized after 
federalization 
Dummy variable that takes 
on value one in the quarter 
when a federalized bank is 
privatized and all following 
quarters 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Privatized  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one in the quarter 
when a bank is privatized 
by the state government and 
all following quarters 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Restructured  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one in the quarter 
when a bank is restructured 
ed by the state government 
and all following quarters.  
The timing is determined by 
the time when contract was 
approved by Federal Senate 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Federalized  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one in the quarter 
Banco Central do Brasil   44
when a bank that has not 
been privatized in the 
sample period is federalized 
and all following quarters 
Time since privatization 
after federalization 
Number of quarters since a 
federalized bank has been 
privatized 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Time since privatization   Number of quarters since a 
bank has been privatized by 
state government 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Time since restructuring  Number of quarters since a 
bank has started the process 
of restructuring 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Time since federalization  Number of quarters since a 
bank that has not been 
privatized in the sample 
period has been federalized 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Non participating state bank  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one for state banks 
that did not participate in 
PROES 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Federal bank  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one for banks that 
are owned by the federal 
government 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Foreign-owned bank  Dummy variable that takes 
on value one for banks that 
are majority owned by 
foreigners 
Banco Central do Brasil 
 